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COMPARISONSAND
INTERPRETATIONS
Preceding chapters contain findings about seven related variables
in a variety of industries: man-hours per unit of product, hourly
earnings, labor cost, total cost, prices received, profit margins, and
aggregate profits. In some divisions of manufacturing and in the
railroad industry, it was possible to explore the relations between
each of the seven variables and fluctuations in the quantity of
goods or services sold. In other industries, it was possible only to
explore the relation between margins and profits on the one hand
and fluctuations in sales (revenue) on the other. In still others,
quantity and revenue tended to rise without serious interruption
over long periods; the only cyclical relations that could be investi-
gated were those between the last two variables and cycles in
business at large. The charts and tables in this chapter summarize
many of the findings. For the reasons just indicated, the kinds of
information assembled differ from industry to industry.
Net Changes During Expansions and Contractions
of Quantity: Manufacturing and Railroads
A conformity score, it will be remembered, is a means of compar-
ing the direction of change in two variables. A high positive score
means that the two variables tend to rise and fall together. A high
negative (inverse) score means that they tend to move in opposite
directions. A low score means there is little relation between their
directions of movement. Man-hours per unit of output produced
by manufacturing industries tended to vary inversely with quan-
tity (Table 87). Hourly earnings, on the other hand, had little
relation to quantity; they rose both in expansions and in contrac-
tions of the latter. Because hourly earnings rose in expansions
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and contractions alike, labor cost per unit of product rose more
often than hours per unit in both. Labor cost, nevertheless, was
also inversely related to quantity. Total cost per unit (including
not only labor but materials, interest on borrowed capital, etc.)
also fluctuated inversely with quantity, although the score was
much lower, since cost often rose in expansions of quantity. The
net, full-phase changes in the prices manufacturers received bore
little relation to upswings and downswings in the quantity of
goods they sold in the mild postwar cycles to which our informa-
tion pertains; they tended to rise in contractions as well as expan-
sions. (The BLS index of prices of finished products, which begins
in 1913, fell in all contractions of business or of manufacturing
production between that year and World War II. So did the index
of prices of semimanufactures.)
In many postwar expansions, prices rose faster than cost, while
in contractions they rose less rapidly than cost. Profit margins
therefore had a strong positive relation to cycles in quantity.
Profits themselves sometimes rose in an expansion even when the
profit margin was declining, and sometimes fell in a contraction
TABLE 87
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8Each expansion or contraction in each industry is treated separately in
computing score.
bproductionworkers only.
0Ratio to sales of net revenue from railway operations.
dNetrevenue from railway operations.154 COST, PRICES, AND PROFITS
even when the margin was rising. Profits were therefore even
more closely related than margins to swings in quantity.
Fluctuations in labor cost on railroads are similar to those in
factories. Hours per unit of service rendered to the shipping and
traveling public varied inversely with traffic. Hourly earnings
tended to rise in both upswings and downswings, with no relation
to traffic; but the rise in expansions was not large enough to keep
labor cost, as well as hours per unit, from varying inversely. Total
cost per unit had a much stronger inverse relation to volume in
the railroad industry than in manufacturing. Prices received for
railroad services, however, tended to vary inversely with volume,
while there was no relation in manufacturing. The inverse fluc-
tuations in cost were larger, percentagewise, than those in railway
rates and fares; profit margins, and likewise profits, therefore
tended to rise and fall with volume on railroads also.
In spite of partial differences with respect to cost and prices,
margins in both manufacturing and the railroad industry usually
widened when volume rose, and narrowed when it declined. In
manufacturing expansions, the rise in margins was caused mainly
by rising prices; in traffic expansions, it was caused mainly by
falling cost. In manufacturing contractions since 1947, and in
traffic contractions, the fall in margins was caused mainly by rising
cost.
Railway rates, fares, and charges were more stable cyclically
than prices of manufactured products. The strong inverse rela-
tion between unit operating cost and traffic, and the large aggre-
gate size of railway fixed charges, make stable rates compatible
with profitability in expansion, and impose obstacles to reduction
of rates in contraction. It has been suggested that railway charges
should be raised in periods of business expansion, and, more
urgently, that they should be reduced in business contraction as a
means of controlling the business cycle, just as interest rates sup-
posedly are or can be used for the same purpose. But if this were
done, railway profit margins would have to be much higher dur-
ing peak prosperity than they have been in the past, or else the
railroads would be in even more imminent danger of bankruptcy
in depressions than they have been. Furthermore, railway charges
are an important component in the costs of manufacturers and
II
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other businessmen. If they fluctuated in the manner suggested,
manufacturing costs would rise more sharply in expansion than
they do. Even though prices of manufactured products are only
loosely related to cost, it is not clear that rising railway charges
would be counter-inflationary.
PATTERNS OF CHANGE DURING EXPANSIONS
AND CONTRACTIONS
The foregoing discussion pertains to net changes in profit
variables during upswings and downswings in quantity of goods
p
orservices sold. Where Table 87 suggests a positive, or inverse,
relation, the relation is often more pronounced during some
portions of cycles in quantity than during others. For some varia-
bles the characteristic direction of change in the earlier portion of
expansions or contractions isdifferent from the characteristic
direction in the later portion.
When a manufacturing industry begins to expand output, the
hours of labor it requires to turn out a unit of product usually
decline (Chart 23). Hourly earnings of production workers com-
monly rise even at this early stage, but the rise is not large enough
to offset the fall in hours per unit, and labor cost per unit usually
declines. Total cost including labor and other expense also usually
falls. In these early stages, the prices the industry receives for its
products decline in most cases, although the majority of declines
is not large. The net result of changes in cost, prices, and volume
is that most profit margins and profits rise.
In later segments of expansion, rises in hours per unit become
more and more frequent, except in the last segment, an exception
which might disappear if we had more data. Falls, however, Out-
number rises in all segments. Hourly earnings in most cases con-
tinue to rise. Labor cost rises more and more frequently, with the
same exception; it rises in more than half of the third segments,
and with more data might be found to rise in most fourth seg-
ments. Rises in total cost become steadily more frequent, and
predominate in the last half of expansion. Increases in the prices
factories receive for their products also become more frequent
but do not always offset the increase in cost. Margins do not widen
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CHART 23
Percentage Frequency of Rises in Profit Variables During
Successive Segments of Quantity Cycles,
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sample of observations, they rise in only half of the fourth seg-
ments. Rising profits, however, predominate over falling profits in
every segment.
When recession comes to an industry, the initial decline in
quantity is usually accompanied by a rise in man-hours and labor
cost per unit of product. Increases in total cost are even more
numerous than in late expansion. But so are increases in prices
received. Margins rose in a small majority of our observations,
and profits in a slightly smaller majority.
I
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Rises in hours per unit are less common after the first segment
of contraction, although the succession of frequencies is irregu-
lar. Hourly earnings and labor cost continued to rise, but the labor
cost frequency dedined continuously. Even at the end, however,
there were more rises than falls; and the percentages would
probably be higher if they included nonproduction labor. In-
creases in total cost likewise become less frequent after the second
segment. After the first, rises in prices received become less fre-
quent, and falls predominate in the last half of contraction. Mar-
gins and profits fall in most cases after the first segment.
Cycles in sales revenue (rather than in quantity) can be ob-
served in all twenty-two subdivisions of manufacturing. Rising
margins and profits were more common in the first than in the
second half of upswings in sales (Chart 24). Rises predominate in
all segments of expansion, however, (except for margins in the
fourth segments) and declines predominate in all segments of
contraction. Changes in the margins and profits of twenty-two
companies before 1942 were similar, except that margins and
profits held up better throughout expansions.
Corresponding curves for the railroad industry look more
eccentric, perhaps because of fewer observations. Hours per unit
always fall in the first half of traffic expansions (Chart 25). Some
rises occur thereafter, but declines predominate throughout.
Hourly earnings usually rise in all except fourth segments; they
rose in exactly half of those. Rises in labor cost become more
frequent, but even in the last segment occur in less than half of
the observations. Rises in total cost also become more frequent
except in fourth segments. Rises in rates and fares have an irreg-
ular curve; but, on the whole, falls predominate. Declines in the
operating margin and in net revenue are more numerous in the
last half of expansion than in the first. Even in the last half, how-
ever, net revenue rises more often than it falls.
When traffic begins to decline, hours per unit, hourly earnings,
labor cost, and total cost rise in most cases. Prices received are also
likely to rise, but not enough to prevent the operating margin and
profit from falling. Rises in the four cost variables are less frequent
in later stages. Rises in the operating margin and net revenue be-
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CHART 25
Railroads: Percentage Frequency of Rises in Profit Variables During
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The charts show what happened most often in the same
segment of different expansions or contractions. They could,
however, give an erroneous impression of the typical sequence of
change in a single expansion or contraction. In Chart 23, for
example, rises in cost outnumber falls in the first three segments
of contractions, but falls are more numerous than rises in the last
segment. The impression might result that a manufacturing
industry, during a downswing, usually encounters rising cost at
first, and falling cost later. In fact, the most common pattern was
a continuous rise, which occurred in 38 per cent of the observa-
tions. For most profit factors, the commonest pattern occurred in
a plurality, but not a majority, of the observations (Table 88).
These percentages may seem low. But if there were no system-
atic relations among the directions of change in successive seg-
ments, each of the sixteen permutations of change described in
Chapter 1 (Table 3) should occur approximately as often as any
other. A continuous rise should occur in about 1/16, or 6 per cent,
of the observations; so should a continuous fall. Since we lump
three permutations into "rise, fall," a rise-fall pattern should occur
in about 3/16, or 19 per cent; so should a fall-rise. We may call
these "neutral" frequencies. The frequencies of the most common
patterns in Table 88 are all higher.
Margins in Other Industrial Divisions
We have not ventured to construct measures of quantity sold for
the telephone industry, the electric utilities, or for trade or con-
struction corporations. At first thought it might seem that we
could use the number of telephone calls in the first case, and
kilowatt-hours sold in the second. But telephone subscribers pay
for a minimum number of calls whether they use them or not. Is
the number of calls, the number of phones, or some weighted
average the best measure? The convenience of the telephone has
greatly increased with the increase in the number of parties that
can be called from any one instrument; subscribers get more and
more potential connections for their money. The average distance
called on toll calls may fluctuate with business conditions. Kilo-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































those in industrial processes) and those sold for high-cost, high-
price uses (as in private homes); industrial use fluctuates more
than household consumption. It would be possible to take care of
this difficulty, but another would remain: sales to any one class of
user include sales in the high-price initial brackets, and sales in
the lower-price later brackets. When the total sales diminish, the
percentage of kilowatt-hours in the higher brackets increases.
With no production indexes, we cannot construct indexes of
price or cost per unit in these four industries. We do, however,
know something about their profit margins. Margins of construc-
tion corporations, and somewhat more imperfectly those of trade
corporations, appear to rise and fall with sales; probably they also
rise and fall with quantity sold. If so, these industries are like
manufacturing and railroads.
Although we have no good measure of percentage change in
the of electric utilities, the peaks and troughs in a
price-weighted output index would probably not differ greatly
from those in kilowatt-hours. Profit margins of electric utilities
vary inversely with kilowatt-hours sold; at least, operating profits
before fixed charges do so.
The telephone industry has had only one contraction in the
number of calls; even if we accept the number of calls as indicat-
ing the dates of turning points in the quantity of service, there are
virtually no cycles. Nevertheless, the telephone industry increases
its service when most other industries are increasing their pro-
duction, i.e., during the greater part of business expansions. It
differs from other industries in that its volume of business rises,
although more gradually, when the income of the others is falling.
Telephone operating margins, however, show no consistent rela-
tion to business cycles (Table 89). If one considers recent cycles
only, they show an inverse relation. When both the telephone
industry and other industries are expanding, the telephone in-
dustry, unlike construction, manufacturing, railroads, or trade
has had a falling margin in recent times.
Probably the decline in the electric operating margin, and in the
telephone operating margin during recent cycles, has been caused
by delays in the adjustment of publicly regulated rates, together
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sions.Short-run economies associated with larger volume, if they
exist, are apparently not sufficient to offset the increases in prices
paid.
The telephone and power industries are regulated with a view
toward giving the investor a fair return over a period of years, but
not necessarily the same rate of return every year, still less every
month or quarter. Cyclical fluctuations in operating margin are
not incompatible with the regulatory objective. Heavy fixed
charges tend to counteract any rise in operating cost during
expansion, although investment in plant and equipment has at
times increased fast enough to negate the tendency. Except in the
inflationary period after the war, the declines in margin during
business expansion have not been severe; a margin ample to
protect against bankruptcy remains at the business peak. The
more rapid growth of telephone or electric service during busi-
ness expansion tends to offset the mild decline in margin, some-
times producing higher aggregate profits and perhaps even a
higher rate of return on investment.
Some Quasi-Margins for All Domestic Business
Profit data for many sections of the economy are inadequate.
From estimates that enter into the Department of Commerce
national income figures, however, it is possible to construct what
may be called a consolidated income account for all domestic
business. The details are illustrated in Table 90. The consolidated
statement differs from ordinary income statements because sales
by one domestic business to another domestic business, charged to
cost of sales by the purchaser, are not included in either sales or
cost. Sales to domestic business, charged to capital account by the
purchaser, are included.
The omissions make it impossible to calculate cost ratios and
profit margins analogous to those we have so far considered. The
omitted items reduceaggregate sales and aggregate costs by the
same amount. We can calculate the ratio of what may be called
external costs (cost-type payments to nonbusiness) to external
sales(sales to nonbusiness, including sales of business capital
equipment, which one may think of as sales to the individuals who
own business enterprises). The difference between this external
I
- .. . 0I
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cost ratio and 100 (Chart 26) may be considered a profit margin
of a sort.
These are very rough figures. For example, the sales include
the gross rental value of homes occupied by their owners, and the
costs include expenses associated with home ownership. One does
not usually think of one's home as an enterprise conducted for a
profit.
Nevertheless, the "margin" looks similar to many other margins
we have examined. It narrows in five contractions of sales. It
widens at the beginning of all four expansions, and usually nar-
rows later. In two of the four expansions it has a net rise, al-
though it has a net fall in the other two.
TABLE 90






c, State and local governments 15,758
d. Foreigners 20,466
e, Total, a +b +c+d 311,226
To domestic business, charged by purchaser to
f. Capital expense 69,042
p. Co8tof sales x
h, Total, f +g 69,042+ x
i.Total sales, e +h 380,268 +x
COST OF SALES
J.Compensationof employees 195,476
k.Indirect tax andnon—taxliability 35,000
1.Transfer payments 1,303
m. Purchasesfrom foreigners 14,658
n. Interest 7,322
o, Rent 10,322
p.Capital consumption allowances 34,266
q. Purchases from domestic business x
r. Total cost 298,347 +x
PROFITa
a. Before tax, i —r 81,921
t.Corporateprofits tax liability 21,959
u, After tax 59,962
COST RATIO
v, 100 •r(excluding x)+i(excluding x) 78.5
Note:x indicates an unknown amount,
a..profit,is total of corporate profit pius income of unincorporated
enterprises,The latter includes reward for owners' labor andmanage-
ment as well as for use of their capital.COMPARISONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 165
Concurrent Margin and Profit Changes
in Industries
In a way, the rough, general, annual figures in the preceding
section round out the picture. More interesting inferences can be
drawn, however, from the varied and detailed data for manufac-
turing industries, to which we revert. In particular, they show that
the profit experiences of different industries are more diverse at
some times during the general economic cycle than at others.
During the later portion of a contraction in business at large, a
growing number of industries expand the quantity of goods they
CHART 26
Ratio of "External" Cost to "External" Sales, All Domestic Business,
1 929—56
SOURCE: Appendix Table B-32.
NOTE: Shaded areas are contractions in
at peaks and troughs in ratio.
"external" sales. Dots are166 COST, PRICES, AND PROFITS
sell. Most of these expanding industries enjoy rising margins and
profits. At the same time, a small but increasing percentage of the
industries that continue to contract also have rising margins,
although not necessarily rising profits.
During the earlier portion of a business expansion, an increas-
ing majority of industries expand. They have rising margins and
profits which presently spread over most of the business economy.
During the later portion of a business expansion, however, an
increasing number of industries contract. Eventually their mar-
gins and profits fall. A majority of the still expanding industries
continue to have rising margins, but the majority is smaller than
before. Falling margins and profits become more prevalent.
In the earlier portion of a business contraction, an increasing
majority of industries have a falling physical volume of sales,
accompanied sooner or later by falling margins and, even more
widely, by falling profits. But as the business contraction wears on,
the number of expanding industries eventually begins to rise, and
the cyclical sequence just described begins to repeat itself. In one
of the three postwar business expansions for which we have data,
however, the Korean episode greatly complicated the sequence.
Causes of Rising Cost
in Expansion and in Contraction
The difference between the percentage of contractions in quantity
with labor cost rising and that with total cost rising is not as wide
as the corresponding difference in expansions. The rises in total
cost during contractions, where they are much more frequent
than during expansions, are due largely to the rise in labor input
per unit of product that is so often associated with diminishing
volume. In other words, rising prices of materials and rising wage
rates are the main causes of rising cost during expansion; greater
input of labor is an important cause during contraction.
( Whendiscussing cost in Chapter 2, we noted that the predomi-
• nance of rises over declines was concentrated in certain time
• groups of expansions.In theearly Korean, 1949—53, and
1954—57 groups, when costs of most industries with expansions
approximately covering those periods rose (Table 15), prices oFCOMPARISONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 167
materials rose substantially (Table 32). In the late Korean and
1958—60 groups, on the other hand, when cost fell in most in-
dustries, prices of materials either fell or rose very little. The
difference among time groups strengthens the conclusion that
rising cost during expansions is caused mostly by rising prices.
Why Cost Often Falls in Late Contraction
Although rising cost predominates in contractions in quantity
sold, the predominance is not nearly as strong in the last as in the
first half of such contractions. Hours per unit and labor cost rise
most often during the first segment.
A substantial amount of new equipment, perhaps ordered
before the contraction set in, is put into service as a contraction
proceeds; new equipment isusually more efficient than old.
Whether or not they have recently received equipment, many
enterprises have some that is more efficient and some that is less
efficient. When the quantity of goods turned out recedes, pro-
duction can be concentrated on the better facilities.
With a smaller volume of business on hand, management may
have more time to devote to more efficient operation of whatever
facilities are at hand; i.e., such matters as discipline, scheduling,
waste of materials, etc.
As cost falls in some industries, managers of those industries
are encouraged to reduce prices. Most reductions in cost during
late contraction are translated into price reductions. Insofar as
their customers are other industries, their price reductions tend to
reduce the costs of those customers. Even industries with rising
cost reduce their prices more frequently in late than in early
contraction.
Rising Demand Often Makes Higher Cost Compatible
with Higher Volume and Profits
There was a net rise in price during thirty-five of the forty-eight
expansions in quantity sold (Table 10). Price and quantity both
rose. We must conclude that in most expansions demand was
higher at the end than at the beginning. Prices also rose in 63 per
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cent of the second, 74 per cent of the third, and 80 per cent of the
fourth segments. We must further conclude that demand rose in
a majority of these instances. Prices roses in nineteen, or 41 per
cent of the first segments; these may be regarded as cases of rising
demand. But what of the first segments of the twenty-seven ex-
pansions in which prices fell?
A rise in quantity sold, accompanied by a fall in price, might be
interpreted as a response of customers to lower prices, i.e., as a
movement along a fixed demand curve. Or it might be interpret-
ed as evidence also of an upward shift in the curve. But if the rise
in quantity is very large in comparison with the fall in price, it is
difficult to believe that demand has not shifted. If a 2 per cent fall
in price is accompanied by a 20 per cent rise in quantity, one
questions whether so large an increase in quantity can be attrib-
uted entirely or even mainly to so small a reduction in price. In
technical language, such an interpretation implies a "price elastic-
ity" of 20 ÷ (—2) or —10. A figure computed in this way from
observed changes in price and quantity may be called a purported
elasticity. Many economists are skeptical of alleged elasticities
materially larger, numerically, than —1. Confronted with a ma-
terially larger figure, they would surmise that something else, as
well as the reduction in price, stimulated customers to increase
their purchases. The demand curve must have risen. Customers
would have increased their purchases to some extent even if the
price had not been cut.
We have computed purported elasticitiesfor each of the
twenty-seven observations. When the change in price is very small,
such computations often yield fantastically high purported elas-
ticities, e.g., —100. In such cases the error in the figures may be
large relative to the change in price, and the extreme ratios
should be disregarded. However, we can arrange the purported
elasticities in the order of size and pick out the median. In this
case the median of the twenty-seven elasticities turns out to be
—2.7, which implies a response to price reduction so large itis
hard to believe. One may conclude that in many of the twenty-
seven observations, rising demand as well as falling price helped
to stimulate sales. Considering these as well as the observations
in which prices went up, demand appears to have risen in most





In earlier and more severe recessions than those with which we
deal here, prices as well as quantities declined; and no doubt
demand fell. In forty-two of the sixty postwar contractions of
quantity sold for which we have data—mostly mild contrac-
tions—there was a net rise in price. Consequently, it is possible on
first thought to explain most of the contractions mainly in terms
of rising prices. But computation of the elasticities implied by
such an explanation again renders this interpretation doubtful.
The median is —4.3; demand must have fallen in many of these
forty-two contractions.
Prices fell in 55 per cent of the third segments and 65 per cent
of the fourth segments of contractions in quantity; in these,
therefore, falling demand predominated. Prices rose, however, in
thirty-four, or 85 per cent, of the first segments and thirty-one, or
78 per cent, of the second segments. The median purported
elasticity for the thirty-four observations is —1.6. In the second
segments, nine of the thirty-one rises in prices were accompanied
by small increases in quantity, which temporarily interrupted the
contractions in the latter. For the remaining twenty-two, the
median purported elasticity is —2.0. These figures suggest that
demand fell in many instances.
That demand for the products of an industry should be higher
at the peak than at the trough of the industry's activity may not
seem remarkable, since its own peak will usually occur in the
neighborhood of a peak in general business activity. When income
is high, consumer spending is large, and industry in general may
badly need additional capacity and therefore have a high demand
for productive equipment. At such a time almost any industry can
sell more goods than it could have sold at the same price when the
general level of activity was lower. But this kind of explanation is
applicable only to one industry or a narrow group of industries,
givenarise in demand in most other industries. It does not ex-
plain a general rise in demand which appears in most of the
diverse branches of manufacturing.
There are influences other than a rise in income, sales, or
• realized profits that tend to raise demand. They include the
development of new commodities and inventions to a point of
more widespread practicability, the wearing out of consumer
durables and industrial equipment, fear of wars, changes in taxes
Tr
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and governmental spending, changes in the ability and willingness
of bankers to expand credit, and other factors. A preponderance
of such influences will raise demand, increase quantities sold, and
thereby generate additional incon e. The spending of the addi-
tional income will, however, tend to spread rising demand over a
wider area.
That factors other than the general business situation influence
demand is shown by the fact that an increasing number of indus-
tries have upturns before the general upturn. Before the business
trough in 4Q 1949, for example, one of our fifteen manufactur-
ing industries had a trough in quantity sold in 3Q1948,three had
a trough in 1Q 1949, and four in 2Q 1949. In all, thirty-three of
our quantity expansions began before the corresponding business
expansion. In ten of these, there was a net rise in price between
the industry and business trough, so rising demand was presuma-
bly a factor. For the other twenty-three, we have computed the
percentage change in output and price for the interval between
the two peaks, and the purported elasticity coefficients. The
median is —3.9, suggesting rises in demand.
Conversely, consumers can become well stocked in the latest
styles of consumer durables, businessmen can become well sup-
plied with the most modern equipment, fear of war may subside,
and other influences may tend to reduce demand. A pre-
ponderance of such influences may cause a general decline in
demand schedules.
Rising demand explains why it was so often possible for a man-
ufacturing group to widen its profit margin during expansions in
spite of rising cost. Falling demand, at least in the last half of
contractions, explains why even groups that were able to reduce
their costs had their margins squeezed.
No Glut Before the Peak
It has sometimes been supposed that, as new plants and equip-
ment are completed and begin to operate during an expansion, a
flood of products from the new equipment gluts the markets,
causing a fall in price which reveals that much of the increased
stock of equipment is unprofitable to operate, at least for the time
iiI
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being. Further investment in new facilities is discouraged, and
these developments help to usher in a recession. If this is how
expansions meet their end, however, one would expect the statis-
tics to show that prices commonly fall in the last segment of an
upswing in quantity sold. Such a conjunction of changes in quan-
tity and price seems to have been rare in the postwar period.
Rising prices were more frequent in the last segment than in any
other segment of expansions in quantity sold. They occurred in
80 per cent of the observed last segments. Margins rose in 48 per
cent, and profits in 74 per cent.
These figures do not make it necessary to reject "excess" ca-
pacity as a cause of postwar recessions. While capacity increases,
the percentage of capacity actually operated may fall. What the
figures do show is that excess capacity, if any, did not often dis-
play itself in the form of a price-breaking glut of products actually
made and hunting a market.
Rising Margins Imply Barriers to Expansion
A rise in the demand curves for the products of an industry
would not, under some circumstances, raise its average margin. If,
as the curves rose, the quantity supplied to its customers rose fast
enough, prices would remain at their initial level; and if the aver-
age cost did not change, the margin would also remain at its initial
level. (In Chart 1, if the quantity sold increased from OA to OA',
the price would not change.) Since prices did rise in many cases,
the quantity sold did not increase fast enough to hold prices at
their initial level. What prevented the quantity sold from expand-
ing to that extent?
One explanation might be accentuated differences in cost.
Manufacturers of any product may at any time have some mini-
mum price in mind for any volume of that product. It would not
be worth their while to sell that quantity at less than that mini-
mum price, which may be called their out-of-pocket cost. If this
cost is higher for larger than for smaller quantities, quantity sold
will not be expanded to the point at which it would sell at the
initial price. Instead, quantity and price will rise to some inter-
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Different parts of the potential supply may have different out-
of-pocket costs. At low levels of demand, only the low-cost sources
will actually supply the market. As demand rises, higher-cost
sources may come in as rising demand makes it possible for them
to charge higher prices. But in a competitive market, the low-cost
sources will also get comparable prices, and they will higher
margins. If the inequality of costs among different sources of
supply rises the average margin should rise.
But actually, cost fell during the first half of most expansions.
Price also fell in some, but not all, of these instances. Even when
prices fell, margins often increased. Changes in cost fail to explain
much of the early rise in prices and margins.
Physical limitations on the expansibility of supply may be an
alternative explanation. If demand rises rapidly, it may be physi-
cally impossible, within a short period, to expand the quantity sold
to the amount that buyers would take, if they could get it, at the
initial prices. Stocks of the commodity in the hands of vendors
may be small, and even a slight rise in sales would exhaust them.
Vendors may wish to sell more, but it takes time for them to place
orders with their sources of supply, for the latter to carry out the
manufacturing or other processes necessary to fill the orders, and
J
fortransport agencies to deliver them. Time may also be con-
sumed in making arrangements to finance an enlarged volume of
business. If the rise in the demand schedule stops, vendors might
soon be able to catch up with it; but if it continues, the physical
limitations may also continue to operate indefinitely.
Most vendors will probably sense a situation of this kind when
the orders or inquiries they receive begin to increase. Each will
realize that he can raise his price without fear of diverting trade to
other vendors, since his competitors would also be offered more
trade than they could handle if they maintained their initial
prices. Or the initiative as to prices may come from buyers; the
latter, finding they cannot obtain enlarged quantities at the old
price, may bid it up. The price will rise, and the quantity sold per
month or quarter will be an amount intermediate between the
original quantity and the quantity that could be sold under the
new demand conditions at the old price. (Again, in Chart 1, a




occur without any conscious or deliberate collusion among ven-
dOrs. It could also occur as the result of collusion.
Physical limitations are more likely to operate when rises in the
demand for many commodities appear simultaneously than if
only one of those rises had occurred. To a large extent, vendors
of different commodities make use of the same raw materials and
would look for additional employees among the same groups of
workers.
Physical limitations in conjunction with rising demand could
raise prices in this manner even if out-of-pocket cost remained at
levels equal to or below the initially prevailing prices, or if it fell.
In such a situation, not only prices but margins would rise. Fur-
thermore, the rise in demand could happen so fast, compared
with the capacity of industry to expand, that even margins on the
highest-cost portion of a higher-cost quantity sold would rise.
Cost, Profits, and the Generation of Cycles
In this report our principal concern has been to determine what
kinds of change in cost and profit accompany fluctuations in
quantity sold, sales revenue, or business at large. Profits, which
depend among other things on cost, have long been regarded as a
part of the econoni c mechanism by which supply is adjusted to
demand. Reversing our approach, can we say anything about the
roles cost and profit play in generating business fluctuations?
Cost falls with increasing frequency in the later half of contrac-
tions, and also falls in the earlier half of most expansions. Falling
cost lowers the floor beneath which business men will not go in
naming prices. Most reductions in cost during late contraction
and early expansion are reflected in falling prices. Even enter-
prises with rising cost become increasingly willing to cut prices as
contraction proceeds. Price cutting appears first in one industry
and then in another, but at low stages of the general economic
cycle itis widespread. Do the increasingly prevalent reductions
stimulate sales and thereby help to turn the economic tide? One
cannot answer this question with much confidence, because the
effect of reducing a price on the sale of that product is not the
only aspect that needs to be considered. General reductions in
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price mean that less income is being distributed by business per
unit of product sold. Such reductions therefore tend to lower the
demand for any specified commodity. In terms of Chart 1, they
tend to move the quantity purchased to the right along demand
curves, but also tend to lower the demand curves themselves.
Conversely, high cost and high prices at high levels of the cycle
tend to move quantity purchased to the left along demand curves,
but also tend to raise the demand curves. We cannot say with
confidence that price increases tend to produce a business reces-
sion.
It is evident, on the other hand, that businessmen do respond
to shifts in demand, which are linked with changes in margins.
Demand usually falls during the later part of contractions and
rises during expansions of quantity sold. This is another way of
saying that quantity sold is adjusted upward and downward in
response to changes in demand. Margins also fall in late contrac-
tion and rise in expansion. What part do the margin changes play
in the adjustment?
Businessmen are often in a position to increase the quantities
they sell without adding to their plant or durable equipment,
particularly near the bottom of a depression. The only additional
expenditure needed is an increase in outlays for material and
labor. Some time must elapse between the additional outlay and
the sale of the resulting product; the additional outlay is tempo-
rarily an investment. A rise in margin, unless it is accompanied by
a substantial lengthening of the production period, means a rise
in the rate of return on such investments. If the average interval
between outlay and the associated revenue is two months, a rise in
the margin amounting to 1 per cent of sales is roughly equivalent
to 6 per cent per year on the investment. Experience shows that
once margins have begun to rise they often continue to rise for
many months. An initial rise can be interpreted as evidence of
better things to come. When this kind of investment ceases to
yield satisfactory returns it can quickly be halted. The changes in
margin that accompany shifting demand do appear to be part of
the mechanism of adjustment.
Margins, however, are usually higher when quantity sold begins
to contract than when it begins to expand. Furthermore, in mostCOMPARISONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 175
cases they rise for a short while when quantity begins to decline.
The foregoing line of analysis does not explain these paradoxes.
Experienced rises in margins probably have less effect on busi-
ness purchases of plant and durable equipment than on requisi-
tions of materials and labor for use in current production. Such
purchases usually require years to pay off. If they are to be made
wisely, they must often promise to improve profits over a period
considerably longer than most of the upswings studied in this
investigation. A cyclical upturn in margins does not provide a
basis for projection sufficient to justify such expenditures. If the
latter would improve profits by reducing cost, a decline in mar-
gins may actually make the investments more attractive, although
it may also niake them harder to finance.1
Recent margins or profits have only a limited effect on quasi-
permanent expenditures. Strengthened expectations of' long-run
economic growth, new commodities that are expected to have
wide sales appeal, and improved designs of plant and equipment
raise the demand for products of the construction and equipment
industries and their suppliers; they help to explain rises in mar-
gins. Conversely, gradual satisfaction of the demand for capital
equipment inspired by such prospects, and failure of equally
potent new prospects to appear, help to explain declines in de-
mand and margins.
'Some readers may wonderwhyratesofreturnonexisting investment have not
been discussed. Such rates, in quarterly or monthly form, are reported in. or
readily computable from, many of our sources of data. The reason they have not
been used is that they are often a poor indicator of the rate of return to be ex-
pected from new investment, and only the latter is meaningful for the study of
business fluctuations.. Much of the investment in plant and equipment existing at
any moment was purchased years ago when prices were different. Part of it has
been written out of the basis of computation by cumulative depreciation. New
property would often be more efficient than old.
1)